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THE INNKEEPER'S LIEN AT COMMON LAW
By JoHN C. HoGAt
The innkeeper's right of retaining is of very great antiquity. The
earliest reported cases on the subject are found in the Year Books.1 Joseph
Henry Beale traces the origin of this lien to the year 1465 and declares that
it is "doubtless a survival of an ancient power of legally permitted self-
help."'2 Although the innkeeper's lien today is generally statutory, it still
retains many of its common law characteristics.
The innkeeper's lien at common law is a specific lien, not a general
lien.3 It is founded on the general custom of the land.4 In Jones v. Thurloe5
the court declared that "by the custom of the realm, if a man be in an inn
one night, the innkeeper may detain his horse until he is paid for the
expenses" but if -the innkeeper "let him depart without payment, then he
has waived the benefit of that custom by his own consent, and shall never
afterwards detain the horse for that expense."'
The law gives authority to a person to enter a common inn, and the
innkeeper (communis hospitator) is generally bound to receive and to keep
safely the goods with which he is travelling.7 In Rex v. Ivens8 the court
announced, that
"the innkeeper is not to select his guests. He has no right to say to one,
You shall come into my inn, and to another, You shall not, as everyone
coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be re-
ceived; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants .
And Lord Esher in Robins and Company v. Gray,1" observed that
"the innkeeper cannot discriminate and say that he will take in the trav-
eller but -not his luggage. If the traveller brought something exceptional
which is.not luggage-such as a tiger .or a package of dynamite---the
t Research Editor, .The. Rand -Corporation, Santa Momca, California.
1 Cf. Y. B: 5 EDvr. 4,-2, pl.20-(1465); Y.B. 21, HENP. 7, 14, pl.19 (1505).
2 BBALE,. IxNxEEPEan AND'Hot -Ls, f 252 n. 1, 11 257 (1906).
3 Cf. JONES, Lrxs,1.498.(1914)-; BEALE, INKEEiPERs AND HOTELS, ff 254 (1906).
But see BROWN, THE! LAWF or PERSONAL PROPERTY 495 (1914).
4 See p. 42 znfra.
ri8 Mod. 172, 88 Eng. Rep. 126 (1723).
O1d. Eng. Rep. at 126.
7 Cf. BLACKSTONE, Com NTARIEs 164 (1823). See discussions of mnkeeper's respOnsx-
bility m BEALE, INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS, ffff 181-191 (1906), and STORY, ComhmETARIEs ON
-THE LAW OF B i.uENTs,. fff1 464W473 (1851).
8 7 C. and P M11, 173 Eng. Rep. 94 (1835).
S 9 Id., Eng: Rep.,. t; 96..The -English court has held that an action would lie against an
innkeeper for wongfully refusing. to receive and lodge a traveller, even though the traveller
could prove no "actual damage." Constantine v. Imperial Hotels, Ltd. [1944-] K.B. 693.
10 [1895] 2 Q.B. 501.
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innkeeper might refuse to take it in; but the custom of the realm is that,
unless there is some reason to the contrary in the exceptional character of
the things brought, he must take in the traveller and his goods.""
At early common law, it was once said that the innkeeper's lien
extended to the person of the guest himself, but not to his property. Bacon's
Abridgment declared that
"Innkeepers may detain the person of the guest who eats, of the horse
which eats, till payment, and this they may do without any agreement for
that purpose; for men that get their livelihood by entertainment of others
cannot annex such disobliging conditions that they shall retain the party's
property in case of non-payment .... 12 (Emphasis added.)
And there is dictum, in Newton v. Trigg," to the effect that the innkeeper
can detain the person of the guest. This dictum, however, was vigorously
repudiated as a "startling proposition" in Sunbolf v. Alford, 4 where the
court observed that the innkeeper can neither detain the person of the
guest, nor "strip the guest of his clothes." In Carlisle v. Quattlebaum,'5
where A "called and breakfasted" at B's establishment, for which B
charged thirty-seven and one-half cents, A tendered a twenty dollar
"Georgia bill," which B could not change, and which B detained for his
charges. In an action by A to recover the twenty dollar bill, the court
declared:
"An innkeeper has no right to detain the property of his guest, though he
may detain his person; unless in the case of a horse, etc., which may be
detained for his feeding. But a horse cannot be detained for the meat of
his master. Nor does it appear that the defendant was an innkeeper, to
which the privilege of detainer is given, because he is bound to receive."1"
This erroneous statement of the law of innkeepers is based upon the dictum
contained in Bacon's Abridgment; on the contrary, at common law, the
11 Id. at 504. Schouler says that "the option of an innkeeper to exclude or receive property
brought by a guest is, of course, a dangerous principle to admit, and it cannot be freely exer-
cised." He suggests that an innkeeper might refuse goods "which he perceived to be injurious
and offensive . . . , or improperly secured, or such in kind, bulk, or value, that no traveller
ought rightfully to make his host answerable for them." SCHOULER, BAL~M:,TS AND CaRRIES,
1 284 (1897).12 BACON's ABRIDGMENT, p. 236 (Bouv. Am. ed.).
13 "Inn-keepers are compellable by the constable to lodge strangers; they may detain the
persons of the guests who eat, or the horse which eats, till payment." Newton v. Trigg, 1 Show.
268, 89 Eng. Rep. 566 (1692).
143 M. and W. 248, 150 Eng. Rep. 1135 (1838). Lord Abinger observed that "it is the
dictum of a single judge, unnecessary for the decision of the case, and resting perhaps on the
authority of a doubtful reporter, who might not have heard accurately what was said: and
I cannot conceive that it be any authority at all on such a subject." Supra, Eng. Rep. at 1137.
15 2 BA=nEY 452 (S.C. 1831).
16 Id. at 453.
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innkeeper does have the right to detain the property of his guest;' 7 he
may not detain the person of his guest;'8 a horse can be detained for the
meat of his master; " and the innkeeper's lien is founded not upon his
obligation to receive, but upon the custom of the realm." Joseph Henry
Beale has observed that this case "must be regarded as overruled."'" He
states that the innkeeper's lien has never been "extended at common law
to any other class of property than tangible personal property; and there
is not the slightest authority for extending it to the person of the debtor." 2
And Justice Story declares that the cases cited by Bacon to support the
proposition that the horse may be detained only for the expense of its
own keeping, and not for the food and entertainment of the guest, "cer-
tainly do not support that doctrine."' Story adds that "the general rule
seems to favor such a lien ... . ,24 In Mulliner v. Florence,' where the
innkeeper detained the horses, carriage, and harness for the keeping of
both the horses and the guest, and later sold the horses, the court acknowl-
edged the existence of the lien, and then held that it had been destroyed by
the sale. Lord Bramwell refused to confine the lien to the horses for their
keep alone-the lien had extended to the whole of the property for the
whole of the guests's debt to the innkeeper.
An innkeeper, at common law, might receive animals and equipage
into the inn-stable, even though the owner was neither lodged nor enter-
tained as a guest at the inn. In such cases, he was presumed to have ac-
cepted them in his capacity as an innkeeper, not as a livery-stable keeper, 3
and he possessed a common law right to detain until paid for his specific
charges. Thus in the Case of an Hostler," the court held that, in the ab-
17 SCHOULER, BAuiEMNTs AND CARaIRs, Uf 326 (1897).
Is Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 M. and W. 248, 150 Eng. Rep. 1135 (1838) ; cf. BEALE, INNKEEP-
ERS AND HOTELS, ff 257 (1914).
19 Jones v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172, 88 Eng. Rep. 126 (1723).
2 0 See discussion, p. 42 infra.
21 BEALE, INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS, ff 252 (n.) 1 (1914).
22 Id. at Uf 257. Story declares that the common carrier has no "lien on the person of the
passenger, or the clothes he has on.' STORY, CoirENTAgRIs ON -T- LAW OF BALMENTS, Uf 604
(1851).
23 STORY. op. cit. supra note -22, at 503, n.5.
2 4 Id. at 504.
25 [18781 3 Q.B. 484. Schouler declares that "the innkeeper's Hen will subject all personal
property brought by a guest infra hospitium, animals inclusive, to the satisfaction of the host's
bill against him." SCHOULER, BAMaMNTS AN CARRIERS, ff 326 (1897). Dobie adds that "there
is a lien on the guest's horse, not only for the charges incurred for the horse itself, but for the
entertainment of the guest, as well." DoBIE, BAIm ENTS .An CARRIERS, Uf 100 (1914).
20 The livery-stable keeper at common law' has no lien. BROWN, TnE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY 463-64 (19.36).
27 ScHOULER, BAmM:ENTS AND CARIERS, U 296 (1897).
2 8 Yelverton 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 46 (1605).
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sence of a special agreement,29 an innkeeper has a lien on a horse for his
food and keeping, and that the horse may be sold after he has eaten his
worth.30 In Robinson v. Walter,1 Chief Justice Mountague said:
"Communia hospitia are compellable to receive guests and their horses....
the custom of London is good and reasonable, how long to stay, not till
he eats out more than his head; the innholder [sic] may sell him presently,
and this is justifiable."
32
but a lien is ordinarily a right to detain, and not to sell the chattel. Thus
Jones v. Pearle"3 subsequently denied the innkeeper's right of sale, except
so far as it existed by custom in London. Stabling, therefore, was a spe-
cial charge, for which the innkeeper was entitled to a lien, whether the
owner of the animal lodged at the inn or not; it was otherwise in the
case of money, baggage or other "dead" property left at the inn by one
not a guest there.34
The innkeeper's lien extends to goods brought by the guest to the inn
(infra hospitium), even though the goods are never actually delivered to
the innkeeper, but are retained by the guest in his own possession. Thus
Beale has observed that the innkeeper's lien differs from
"other liens created by the common law in that technical possession on
the part of the innkeeper is not necessary for the enforcement of the lien.
Although the goods remain in the possession of the guest, the innkeeper
may prevent their being carried from the inn, take them into his own ac-
tual possession, and hold them as security for his charges. '35
The innkeeper's lien, at common law, did not exist in favor of the
keeper of a boarding or lodging house. 6 The distinction between an inn
and a boarding house was pointed out in Pinkerton v. Woodward,3T an
early California case, concerned with the liability of an innkeeper for
certain coin and gold dust belonging to the guest which had been stolen
from the innkeeper's safe; the court said:
29 The old rule was, that a bailee loses his right to detain, if he stipulates for a particular
price.
30 The court explained the reason for this rule as follows: "if a tailor has my apparel to
make, and he makes it accordingly, he is not obligated to deliver it till he is paid for the mak-
ing of it; but although in that case he may detain till he is paid; yet for default of payment he
cannot sell it, as in the other case he may sell the horse; the reason is, because the keeping of
the horse is a charge, because he eats; but the keeping of the apparel is not any charge." Case
of an Hostler, Yelverton 67, 80 Eng. Rep. 47 (1605).
313 Bulst. 269, 81 Eng. Rep. 227 (1616).
32 Id., Eng. Rep. at 228.
33 1 Stra. 557, 93 Eng. Rep. 698 (1723).
84 Cf. SCHOULER, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS, IT 251 (1897).
35 BEALE, INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS, fT 251 (1906).
36 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW or BAnlMNTS, IT 475 (1851).
37 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366 (1867).
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"an inn is a public place of entertainment for all travellers who choose to
visit it. It is distinguished from a private lodging or boarding house in this:
that the keeper of the latter is at liberty to choose his guests, while the
innkeeper is obligated to entertain and furnish all travellers of good con-
duct and means of payment everything which they have occasion for, as
such travellers, on their way.'"s
In Pollock v. Landis,"' the court declared that
"there are two classes of persons who are entertained by innkeepers for re-
ward, guests and boarders. Upon the goods of the former, the innkeeper has
a lien, but upon those of the latter, he has not."40
And the common law rules as to inns, including the right of lien with regard
to the distinction between guests and boarders, were extended to city hotels,
in Thompson v. Lacy,41 where the court defined an inn as "a house where
the traveller is furnished with everything which he has occasion for whilst
upon his way."' In Fay v. The Pacific Improvement Company,43 the court
announced that "an inn is a house which is held out to the public as a place
where all transient persons who come will be received and entertained as
guests for compensaion,--a hotel. '44
The common law recognizes different categories of goods receivedinfra
hospitium, and different situations or relationships under which the goods
may be received. Thus, there are goods which the innkeeper is obligated
to receive, and there are goods which he is not obligated to receive, but
which, at his own election, he may receive. There are goods which are the
property of the guest, and there are goods which are the property of a third
person, but which are in the possession of the guest-in the latter case, the
possession of the guest may be rightful (as in the case of a travelling sales-
man), or it may be wrongful (as in the case of a thief); and in either case,
the innkeeper may or may not have scienter of the third party's property
in the goods. The goods of the third party may be received by the innkeeper
as the goods of the guest, or they may be received as the goods of the third
38 Ibid.
39 36 Iowa 651 (1873).
4 0 Id. at 652.
413 B. and Ald. 283, 106 Eng. Rep. 667 (1820).
4 Id., Eng. Rep. at 668.
43 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099 (1892).
44Id. at 259, 26 Pac. at 1100. To be recognized in law as a common inn, it is not essential,
at common law, that the establishment display a sign announcing that fact. Thus in Collins'
Case it is reported that "fuit auxy tenus per cur', que si un keep un inn, & maintain sign, il est
lie de hospiter estrangers; & s'il ceo deny, action sur le case gist; come 8 E. 4 est. Et Dodderidge
observe, le plaintiff ne besoigne de alleager, que le inn fuit erect per authority and license: mes
solement que le defendant teigne commune hospitium. Et ils teigne, que un innkeeper poet a
son pleasure domolish son sign, & maintain inn sans sign, ceo remainera commune hospitium,
& liable al estrangers." Palmer 373, 81 Eng. Rep. 1130 (Trin. 21 Jac. B.R.).
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person, merely for the use of the guest; furthermore, the goods may be
received by the innkeeper in his capacity as an innkeeper, or, in some cases,
they may be received by him not as an innkeeper, but as a bailee, with or
without compensation. In deciding whether the innkeeper has a lien against
the goods, it is necessary, therefore, to determine the category of the goods,
the relationship under which the goods were received by the innkeeper,
and, sometimes, the innkeeper's scienter of the guest's property, or lack of
property, in the goods. In some of the situations just recited, the innkeeper,
at common law, has no lien against the goods.
Where the goods are the property of the guest and are received into the
inn by the innkeeper in his capacity as an innkeeper, a common law specific
lien attaches to those goods.4" It is immaterial whether or not the innkeeper
is obligated to receive the goods, for if he takes them in, the lien attaches in
either case.46 And the lien covers not only the expense of keeping the goods,
but also the cost of the food and entertainment of the guest. 7
The problem arises where the goods are the property of a third person
and are merely in the possession of the guest. Where the possession of the
guest is wrongful, as in the case of a thief coming to the inn with stolen
goods, the innkeeper's lien at common law extends to such goods only if
the innkeeper acts in good faith and is not aware of the guest's wrongful
possession.4" Thus, where X steals A's trunk and takes it to B's inn, B,
having no knowledge of the theft, may detain the trunk for his charges
regardless of A's title. But if B knows that X has stolen the trunk, he is
not entitled to the lien.
In Robinson v. Walter,49 where a stranger brought the plaintiff's horse
to the defendant's inn and there set him up for some time and then went
away, the court held that the innkeeper was justified in refusing to deliver
the animal to the plaintiff until compensated for its keeping. Justice Croke
declared that:
"If a man's horse be stolen, and brought unto an inn, or if a man lends his
horse to one for a day, and he keeps him three or four days, the innkeeper
here was in no fault at all. If the horse was stolen and brought thither ....
* * * * the innkeeper hath done no wrong at all, the owner is to satisfy him
for his meat, because he was here compellable to receive him.""'
And Justice Dodderidge observed that when a man has lost his horse,
"if he should not be enforced to pay for his meat, this would be a trick,
to have his horse kept for nothing, and to have him brought by his servant
45 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, ff 476 (1851).
46 BEALE, INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS, ff 256 (1906).
47 STORY, op. cit. supra note 45.
48 DOBIE, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS, ff 100 (1914).
493 Bulst. 269, 81 Eng. Rep. 227 (1616).
50 Id., Eng. Rep. at 228.
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to the inn. The owner hath a benefit, meat for his horse, and for the which
he ought to pay."51
In Yorke v. Grenaugh,52 an action in replevin for a horse where the de-
fendant pleaded that he was an innkeeper, that the horse had been brought
to the inn by a person unknown to him, that he had stabled and fed it and
detained it for his charges, the court declared:
"supposing that this traveler was a robber, and had stolen this horse;
yet if he comes to an inn, and is a guest there, and delivers the horse to the
innkeeper (who does not know it) the innkeeper is obliged to accept the
horse; and then it is very reasonable, that he shall have a remedy for pay-
ment, which is by retainer. And he is not obliged to consider, who is the
owner of the horse, but whether he who brings him is his guest or not. ' ' 3
(Emphasis added.)
In Johnson v. Hill," an action of trover by the owner of the goods
against an innkeeper who asserted a lien, Chief Justice Abbott charged the
jury as follows:
"the question was, whether the defendant knew at the time when the horse
was delivered to his custody, that Pritchard was not the owner of the prop-
erty, but a mere wrongdoer; if he knew that fact, he made himself a party
to the wrongful act of Pritchard and could not insist on any recompense
for the keeping of the horse."55
In Black v. Brennan,58 an innkeeper was allowed a lien on a stolen horse
where he had no knowledge of the theft at the time the horse was received
into the inn.
Where the possession of the guest is rightful, as in the case of a travel-
ling salesman coming to the inn with the goods of his employer which he
has been entrusted to sell, there has been a split of authority as to whether
the innkeeper's lien extends to such goods.5 7 Some American courts have
allowed the lien only where the innkeeper has no scienter that the goods are
the property of a third person; they assert that the innkeeper has no lien
on goods that he knows are not the property of the guest. Cook v. Kane5 s
was an action by an innkeeper against the guest to enforce a lien on a piano
which had been sent by a third party to the guest to sell, this fact being
unknown to the innkeeper who had received the piano into the inn as the
property of the guest. The Oregon court declared:
51 1d., Eng. Rep. at 229.
52 2 Ld. Raym. 866, 92 Eng. Rep. 79 (1703).
53 Id., Eng. Rep. at 79.
54 3 Stark. 172, 171 Eng. Rep. 812 (1822).
55 Id., Eng. Rep. at 812.
56 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 310 (1837).
57 BEALE, ImXEEPRS AND HOTELS, Uf1261-62 (1906).
58 13 Oregon 482, 11 Pac. 226 (1886).
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"Nor is the lien confined to property owned by the guest, but it will attach
to property of third persons for whom the guest is bailee, provided only he
received the property on the faith of the innkeeping relation. But the lien
will not attach if the innkeeper knew the property taken in his custody was
not owned by his guest, nor had any right to deposit it as a bailee or other-
wise, except some proper charge incurred against the specific chattel." 59
(Emphasis added.)
This view was also taken by the North Carolina court in Covington v.
Newberger." In Lines Music Company v. Holt,6 1 where the statute was
said to have "re-established the common law right of a lien to hotel and
innkeepers as it existed at common law," the court took the position that
the innkeeper's lien extended to the goods of a third party where the inn-
keeper was unaware that the guest did not own them.
The English courts, and, in general, the American courts, hold that it is
immaterial whether the innkeeper has scienter of the third party's owner-
ship of the goods, and that the innkeeper's lien attaches to all goods right-
fully in the possession of the guest which are brought to the inn by the
guest, regardless of the question of actual ownership.2 Thus in the leading
English case, Robins and Company v. Gray,6" the court declared that
"an innkeeper is bound to take in goods with which a person who comes to
the inn is travelling as his goods, unless they are of an exceptional char-
acter; that the innkeeper's lien attaches; and that the question of whose
property the goods are, or of the innkeeper's knowledge as to whose prop-
erty they are, is immaterial."
64
Lord Esher protested "against being asked, upon some new discovery as to
the law of innkeeper's lien, to disturb a well-known and very large business
carried on in this country for centuries."' He declared that the duties,
liabilities, and rights of innkeepers in respect to the goods brought into the
inn by the guest are founded upon the custom of the realm, and are depend-
ent upon that and that alone. The innkeeper is bound by law to take in the
goods of the traveller, unless they are of an exceptional character; he is
bound by law to keep the goods he has taken in safely; and by law he has
a lien upon the goods for his expenses in keeping them, as well as for the
food and entertainment of the guest. He added:
"That has been the law for two or three hundred years; but today some
expressions used by judges, and some questions-immaterial, as it seems to
59 Ibid.
60 99 N.C. 523, 6 S.E. 205 (1888).
61332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32 (1933).
62 DoBra, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS, f 100 (1914).
63 [1895] 2 Q.B. 501.
64 Id. at 505.
65 Id. at 503.
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me-which have been left to juries, are relied on to establish that if the
innkeeper knows that the goods are not the goods of the person who brings
them to the inn, he may refuse to take them in, or, if he does take them in,
he has no lien upon them .... Now, is there any decided case in which it
has been held that, although goods have been brought to an inn as the lug-
gage of the traveller and received as such by the innkeeper, he has no lien
upon them if he knows they are not the goods of the traveller? There is not
one such case to be found in the books."66
It is sometimes necessary to determine the nature of the relationship
under which the goods were received into the inn, i.e., whether they were
received as the goods of the guest, or whether they were received as the
goods of a third party to be delivered to the guest for a special temporary
purpose. The case of Broadwood v. Granara6 7 can be distinguished on this
basis. Where the plaintiff sent Monsieur Hababier a boudoir grand piano-
forte to practice on, and the innkeeper claimed a lien upon it until com-
pensated for his charges, the court declared:
"We are all of opinion that the lien claimed by the defendant cannot pre-
vail .... This is the case of goods, not brought to the inn by a traveller as
his goods, either upon his coming to or whilst staying at the inn, but they
are goods furnished for his temporary use by a third person, and known by
the innkeeper to belong to that person.., it was known to the defendant
that the pianoforte was not the property of the guest, and that it was sent
to him for a special purpose."6 8
Justice Platt added that this "case does not fall within the principles of law
relating to the lien of innkeepers."6 9 Justice Parke declared that
"it is not necessary to advert to the decisions on the subject of an inn-
keeper's lien, because this is not the case of goods brougkt by a guest to
an inn in that sense in which the innkeeper has a lien upon them; but it is
the case of goods sent to the guest for a particular purpose, and known by
the innkeeper to be the property of another person. It therefore seems to
me that there is no pretense for saying that the defendant has any lien." 70
In Robins and Company v. Gray,7 Justice Kay referred to an analogous
case put before the court in the argument by the Master of the Rolls; thus
"suppose a jeweller in the town sent, with the knowledge of the innkeeper,
certain jewels to a guest at the inn on approval, and allowed them to remain
in the inn for some days-could the innkeeper claim and enforce a lien
upon those jewels? I should think he could not because they were sent for
o Id. at 5oS.
67 10 Exch. 417, 156 Eng. Rep. 499 (1854).
6a Id., Eng. Rep. at 501.
6 Id., Eng. Rep. at 502.
7 0 d., Eng. Rep. at 502.
71 [1895] 2 Q.B. 501.
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a special temporary purpose, and the innkeeper knew it; they were there-
fore, not sent as the goods-I do not mean the property-of the guest.
'72
The Restatement of Security takes the position that the hotelkeeper's
possessory lien, as to persons other than the guest who have an interest
superior to that of the guest in chattels brought on the premises of the hotel
by or for the guest, extends to such chattels
"unless the hotelkeeper (a) knows that the guest is wrongfully in posses-
sion of the chattels, or (b) knows that another person has an interest in
the chattel superior to the guest and circumstances do not justify the infer-
ence that the guest is permitted to bring them to or receive them at the
hotel as if they were his own."
' T
7
The Restatement maintains that the hotelkeeper's lien sometimes can be
defeated by third persons on a showing that the innkeeper had scienter of
the superior interests of the third persons at the time the chattels are re-
ceived. Thus if B knows that A is wrongfully or criminally in possession of
C's chattels, B need not participate in A's wrong or crime by receiving the
goods, but if he does then no lien exists upon the goods, except in respect
of A. Where B learns of A's wrongful possession after A's arrival, the lien
is limited to charges arising before B acquired such knowledge.74
The guest's ownership of the goods is not necessarily the determining
factor in respect of the hotelkeeper's lien, however, because the guest's pos-
session of the goods may be authorized by the owner-i.e., the case of the
travelling salesman who does not own the samples but who is privileged to
take them to any hotel on his route. In such case, the Restatement declares,
the
"guest's lack of ownership is immaterial, and likewise immaterial is the
hotelkeeper's knowledge of the facts. The knowledge of the hotelkeeper of
the superior interest of third persons is important only if, added to this
knowledge, there are circumstances which are inconsistent with the infer-
ence that the guest is permitted to treat the chattels as his own, at least so
far as his stay in the hotel is concerned."
75
As pointed out above, there is a "grave conflict" at common law among
the courts as to whether the innkeeper's lien will attach to goods brought
to the inn by a guest who is not the owner of the goods. 76 The root of this
conflict is traceable to a collision between two fundamental principles of
the law-namely, the right of the innkeeper to detain, which is founded
upon the custom of the realm, and the principle that the property of one
72 1d. at 508.
73 RESTATEMNNT, SECTJRY, § 63 (1941).
74Ibid., Comment on Subsection (2).
75 Ibid.
76 Dorn , BAILMENTS AND CARRPERS, ff 100 (1914).
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man shall not be taken for the debts of another man, against the owner's
consent, unless he has done some act or has neglected some duty creating
the liability. Justice Thayer, dissenting in Cook v. Kane,7  declared that
"a party cannot be deprived of his ownership to property to satisfy the
claim of another, unless he has in some form obligated himself to submit to
it. He must have agreed to it in terms, or have done some act directly or
remotely authorizing it."
78
Thus, the courts that allow the lien, in cases like those of which we have
just been speaking, seem to ignore the right of property, and under the
cloak of custom,"' make the innkeeper's rights superior to those of the prop-
erty owner. The following section will examine this principle upon which
the innkeeper's lien is said to depend.
The Principle Upon Which the Innkeeper's Lie-i Depends
It is necessary to take a close look at a certain principle enunciated in
the cases and in the treatises concerning the lien of the innkeeper-namely,
that the innkeeper's right to detain is founded upon the custom of the realm,
and is dependent upon that, and that alone."' This principle, which was
formulated sometime prior to the sixteenth century, has undergone an in-
teresting development which can be traced through the decisions and dicta
of the courts.
The courts have not always been content to say that the innkeeper's
right to detain is founded simply on custom. The old judges sought to ex-
plain what was meant by custom and to found the lien upon some specific
obligation. Thus in the reasoning of the cases the innkeeper's lien has been
made to depend upon various grounds: in some of the early cases it was
founded exclusively upon his obligation to receive; by a shift in the reason-
ing of the courts, it was later made to depend exclusively upon his strict
liability; still later the courts took the position that the lien arose both from
the obligation to receive and the strict liability; now it is said that the inn-
keeper's lien is founded upon the custom of the realm, and is dependent
upon that alone. The lien and the liability arise, it is said, from the fact
that the innkeeper has taken the goods in, regardless of whether there is
77 13 Oregon 482, 11 Pac. 226 (1886).
78 Ibid.
79 "Judges have found the formula of immemorial usage a convenient cloak beneath which
they might perform no end of tricks to dazzle the credulous." Brown, Cu.stornary Law in
Modern England, 5 CoL. L. REv. 561 (1905).
80 Cf. Robins & Co. v. Gray, [1895] 2 Q.B. 501. Azo (died 1230), who knew from experi-
ence what custom was, declared: "A custom can be called long if it was introduced within ten
or twenty years, very long if it dates from thirty years, and andent if it dates from forty
years." Quoted in HAn, READInnws 3N JJRiSPRuDENCz. 875 (1938).
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an obligation to receive. Thus, the obligation to receive, the strict liability,
and the right of lien are viewed as independent propositions.
Under the Roman Law, the innkeeper had no lien, unless expressly bar-
gained for, but he had the right to choose and select the persons that would
be received into the inn as guests.8 And he was held strictly accountable
for the goods of his guests.12 Under the common law, the innkeeper had
no right of choice, except in limited circumstances, but by law he was given
a lien against the goods of the guest. He also was held strictly accountable
for the goods of the guest.8 3 In the reasoning of some of the earlier cases,
this right of lien seems to have been looked upon as a substitute for the
right of choice.
In the Six Carpenters' Case4 (1610), which discusses the distinctions
between trespass vi et armis and trespass ab initio, the court, by way of
dictum, declared that "the law gives authority to enter a common inn, or
tavern, so to the lord to distrain."' 5 This is a distinct statement that the
innkeeper is obligated by law to receive, and for this reason,86 by law, he
may distrain until compensated for his charges. In Robinson v. Walter
T
(1616), where a horse had been left at the inn by a stranger and the inn-
keeper refused to deliver the animal to its true owner until paid for the
keeping, the Justices engaged in a friendly colloquy concerning the right
of the innkeeper to detain. Chief Justice Mountague argued that the inn-
keeper might detain the horse "because he is compellable at the first to
receive him." 8 Justice Dodderidge maintained that the innkeeper's "re-
tainer here is grounded upon the general custom of the land: He is [bound]
to receive all guests and horses that come to his inn: ...and therefore
there is very great reason for him to retain .. .,.9 (Emphasis added.)
But Justice Croke declared that the innkeeper could detain the horse "be-
cause he was compellable to receive him."9 When a similar situation arose
81 JUSTINIAN, DicEST, 4, 9, 1, 1.
82 According to Max Radin, the innkeeper was held strictly accountable for the goods,
because he had this right of choice. RADIN, ROMAN LAW, I 94 (1927).
83 Although the innkeeper's liability is frequently referred to as "common law" liability,
Max Radin argues that it was taken over from the Roman Law. RADIz, ROMAN LAW, 1 94
(1927); cf. JONES, LIENS 125 ff. (1914). Justice Holmes, on the other hand, maintains that
it arose as a "fragmentary survival from the general law of bailment" whereby the bailee
not the bailor, was the only person who could bring an action against a wrongdoer. HoI.ME,
TnE COMMON LAW 180 (1881).
84 Coke 146a, 77 Eng. Rep. 695 (1610).
85 Id., Eng. Rep. at 696.
86 "So" as an adverb: for this reason (denoting sequence or consequence). Thus, the law
gives authority to enter, so the law gives authority to the lord to distrain.
873 Bulst. 269, 81 Eng. Rep. 227 (1616).
88 Id., Eng. Rep. at 228.
89 Id., Eng. Rep. at 227.
90 Id., Eng. Rep. at 228.
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in Yorke v. Grenaugh'1 (1703), the court said that "the innkeeper is obli-
gated to accept the horse; and then it is very reasonable, that he shall have
a remedy for payment, which is by retainer."'92 And Chief Justice Holt
cited the unreported case of the Exeter Carrier where it was held that
"since the law compelled him [the carrier] to carry them [the goods], it
will give him remedy for the premium due for the carriage." The court
added that "the same reason holds in this case.)
93
In Broadwood v. Granara4 (1854), where a piano was sent to the guest
for a special purpose, and the innkeeper knew that the piano was not the
property of the guest and did not receive it as a part of the goods of the
guest, the court denied the lien. Judge Parke's dictum is now famous,
namely that
"the principle on which the innkeeper's lien depends, is that he is bound to
receive travellers and the goods which they bring with them to the inn.
... the lien cannot be claimed except in respect of goods which, in perform-
ance of his duty to the public, he is bound to receive."9 5 (Emphasis added.)
In the two decisions of the Borwick case (1872 and 1875) the court
is seen making the transition from "an obligation to receive" to "strict
liability" as the basis for the innkeeper's right to detain. In deciding that
the lien extended to goods which the innkeeper might possibly have refused
to receive, the court found a new basis for allowing the lien--i.e., the strict
liability of the innkeeper. Thus in Threfall v. Borwick9" (1872), where the
innkeeper received the piano as the goods of the guest, Justice Mellor
declared:
"When, having accommodation, he has received the guest with his goods,
and thereby has become liable for their safe custody, it would be hard if he
was not to have a lien on it. And under such circumstances, the lien must
be held to extend to goods which he might possibly have refused to re-
ceive." 97 (Emphasis added.)
And Justice Quain declared: "If, therefore, the innkeeper be liable for the
loss, it seems to follow he must also have a lien upon them."9 8 (Emphasis
added.) When Threfall v. Borwick"9 (1875) came on appeal, the court
held that it is immaterial whether the innkeeper is obligated to receive the
912 Ld. Raym. 866, 92 Eng. Rep. 79 (1703).
9 2 Id., Eng. Rep at 79.
9 3 Id., Eng. Rep. at 80.
94 10 Exch. 417, 156 Eng. Rep. 499 (1854).
95 Id., Eng. Rep. at 502.
96 [1872] 7 Q.B. 711.
9 71d. at 712.
9 8 Id. at 715.
99 [1875] 10 Q.B. 417.
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property of the guest; if he receives the goods, and thereby becomes liable,
then he is entitled to the lien.
In Cook v. Kane... (1886), where the innkeeper received the piano as
the property of the guest, unaware that it was actually the property of a
third person, the court cited the Borwick case as authority, and then
declared:
"Whenever, by virtue of the relation of innkeeper and guest, the law im-
poses this extraordinary responsibility for the goods of the guest, it gives
the innkeeper a corresponding security upon the goods put by the guest
into his possession.'
0'
The new reasoning had now taken hold; thus a case "Note" in the Har-
vard Law Review in 1895 declared: "As the innkeeper's lien is grounded
... on the extraordinary liability imposed on him by law, it seems only just
that on all goods which he is bound to receive he should have his lien,
whether or not he knows them to be the property of another than his
guest."' °2 (Emphasis added.)
The new reasoning was sometimes combined with the old, namely where
the goods in question were of a kind the innkeeper was obligated to receive.
Thus in Gordon v. Silber 13 (1890), where the innkeeper detained the lug-
luge of the wife, which had been received into the inn with the luggage of
the husband, for the entertainment and keep of the husband, the court first
recited the fact that under common law an innkeeper is obligated to receive
the guest and his goods, and then declared:
"The innkeeper is under an obligation to keep the goods of a guest received
into the inn safely and securely, and can be sued and made liable in dam-
ages if he fails in this respect. As a compensation for the burden thus im-
posed upon him, the law has given him a lien upon the goods of the guest
until he discharges the expenses of his lodging and food .... It seems,
therefore, that the lien is commensurate with the obligation to receive the
guest and to keep safely and securely his goods. The right of lien of an
innkeeper depends upon the fact that the goods came into his possession,




In Robins and Company v. Gray. 5 (1895), where the innkeeper ac-
cepted the goods with full knowledge that they were not the property of
the guest, and then sought to detain them for the guest's keeping, the court
declared that:
100 13 Oregon 482, 11 Pac. 226 (1886).
101 Ibid.
1029 HAxv. L. REv. 216 (1895-1896).
103 [1890] 25 Q.B. 491.
104 Ibid.
105 [1895] 2 Q.B. 501.
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"The duties, liabilities, and rights of innkeepers with respect to goods
brought to inns by guests are founded, not upon bailment, or pledge, or
contract, but upon the custom of the realm with regard to innkeepers.
Their rights and liabilities are dependent upon that, and that alone .... 106
(Emphasis added.)
The obligation to receive, the strict liability, and the right of lien are recited
as independent propositions founded on the custom of the realm. Thus,
Lord Esher was of the opinion that
"an innkeeper is bound to take in the goods with which a person who comes
to the inn is travelling as his goods, unless they are of an exceptional char-
acter; that the innkeeper's lien attaches, and that the question of whose
property the goods are, or of the innkeeper's knowledge as to whose prop-
erty they are, is immaterial."'
10 7
The lien arises from the fact that the innkeeper has taken the goods in,
not from any obligation to take them in. Thus,
"suppose the things brought are such things as the innkeeper is not bound
to take in, he may... refuse to take them in ... but if after the innkeeper
changes his mind and does take them in, then they are in the same position
as goods properly offered to the innkeeper according to the custom of the
realm." 08
So, too, the court adds that the "liability [is] fixed uponthe innkeeper by
the fact that he has taken the goods in."109
Justice Kay, in a concurring opinion, took a long reach back into his-
tory, and came up with Judge Dodderidge's 1616 dictum in Robinson v.
Walter, 0 and this, Justice Kay said, "is a distinct statement that the inn-
keeper's lien is founded on the general custom of the land ....
The development of the innkeeper's lien at common law has been essen-
tially a process of equating interests-those of the innkeeper on the one
hand with those of the property owner on the other, and at the same time
adjusting to the requirements of a changing and expanding society. The
right to detain property amounts to the right to destroy property, at least
insofar as the owner out of possession is concerned. But the right of the
innkeeper to compensation for services rendered upon property or to the





110 See quotation, page 44 above.
111 [1895] 2 Q.B. 501.
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keeper's lien, therefore, has been essentially a problem of balancing these
interests.
It has been correctly said that "The common law like its English king
never dies; it persists from age to age, and though the instance of its rules
may be seen to change as old conditions pass away and new conditions
arise, its fundamental principles remain . ., .112
112 Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARv.
L. REv. 156, 160 (1903-1904).
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